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Abstract
Relativistic cryptography exploits the fact that no information can travel faster than the
speed of light in order to obtain security guarantees that cannot be achieved from the laws
of quantum mechanics alone. Recently, Lunghi et al [Phys. Rev. Lett. 2015] presented a bit
commitment scheme where each party uses two agents that exchange classical information in a
synchronized fashion, and that is both hiding and binding. A caveat is that the commitment
time is intrinsically limited by the spatial configuration of the players, and increasing this time
requires the agents to exchange messages during the whole duration of the protocol. While such
a solution remains computationally attractive, its practicality is severely limited in realistic
settings since all communication must remain perfectly synchronized at all times.
In this work, we introduce a robust protocol for relativistic bit commitment that tolerates
failures of the classical communication network. This is done by adding a third agent to both
parties. Our scheme provides a quadratic improvement in terms of expected sustain time com-
pared to the original protocol, while retaining the same level of security.
1 Introduction
Bit commitment is a cryptographic primitive between two players Alice (the committer), and Bob
(the receiver) who do not trust each other. A bit commitment protocol has two main phases: a
commit phase and an open (or reveal) phase. Alice commits to a bit d during the commit phase. We
say that the protocol is hiding if before the open phase, Bob has no information about d. During
the open phase, Alice reveals d to Bob, who wants to make sure that Alice didn’t change her mind
about the value of d, this is the binding property.
It is well-known that bit commitment is impossible in the standard model [BOGKW88], even
when allowing for quantum protocols [May97, LC97]. In that case, it was shown that a protocol
cannot be both hiding and binding. On the other hand, bit commitment becomes possible in the
splitting agent model, where the two players Alice and Bob have a coalition of agents at their
disposal: A1, . . . ,Am for Alice, B1, . . . ,Bm for Bob. The basic idea is to dispatch these agents in m
distant locations and restrict the information exchange between different locations. This model has
been extensively considered in the classical domain since the no communication assumption allows
to implement many interesting cryptographic primitives: bit commitment [BOGKW88], oblivious
transfer [NP00] or protocols for private information retrieval [GIKM98, KdW04, Gas04].
From a practical point of view, however, the no communication assumption is a bit difficult to
justify. A convincing way to enforce it is to rely on the No Superluminal Signaling (NSS) principle
which states that no carrier of information can travel faster than the speed of light. In particular,
an event in spacetime cannot be influenced by events which do not lie in its past causal cone.
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The idea of using the NSS principle for cryptographic protocols originated in a pioneering work
by Kent in 1999 [Ken99] as a way to physically enforce the non communication constraint between
the different agents of one party. The original goal of Kent was to bypass the no-go theorems
for quantum bit-commitment [May97, LC97]. Interestingly, this original protocol was classical and
allowed for several rounds which increased the lifespan of the protocol. However, the protocol
required to exchange messages whose length scaled exponentially in the number of rounds (i.e. the
commitment time) and a feasible implementation was not possible for a large number of rounds.
A subsequent work [Ken05] improved this scaling, but to our knowledge, no precise time/security
tradeoff is available for this protocol.
More recently, quantum relativistic bit commitment protocols were developed where the parties
exchange quantum systems, with the hope that combining the NSS principle with quantum theory
will lead to more secure (but less practical) protocols [Ken11, Ken12, KTHW13]. In particular,
the protocol [Ken12] was implemented in Ref. [LKB+13]. We note that the scope of relativistic
cryptography is not limited to bit commitment. For instance, there was recently some interest
(sparked again by Kent) for position-verification protocols [KMS11, LL11, Unr14] but contrary to
the case of bit commitment, it was shown that secure position-verification is impossible both in the
classical and the quantum settings [CGMO09, BCF+14].
The original idea of [BOGKW88] was recently revisited by Crépeau et al. [CSST11] (see also
[Sim07]). Based on this work, Lunghi et al. devised a multi-round bit commitment protocol involving
only four agents, two for Alice and two for Bob [LKB+15]. They managed to prove that this protocol,
which we call the “FQ protocol” from now on, remains secure for several rounds, against classical
attacks. Unfortunately, this proof was rather inefficient since the complexity of the protocol (the size
of the messages the agents need to exchange at each round) scaled exponentially with the number
of rounds. Recently, two papers improved the security proof and showed that the complexity of the
protocol in fact only scales logarithmically with the number of rounds [CCL15, FF16], implying that
the commitment time is essentially unlimited. This much better scaling shows that the protocol is
quite practical, and a convincing experiment recently demonstrated the possibility of sustaining a
commitment for 24 hours [VMH+16], consisting of 5 × 109 rounds. Although quite impressive, it
should be noted that this implementation crucially used a 1 meter dedicated optical link between A1
and B1 (as well as betweenA2 and B2). In order to implement the protocol in a more realistic fashion,
Alice and Bob’s agents would need to communicate over a real telecom network, which is prone to
rare failures, for instance delays in packet deliveries that would invalidate the no communication
assumption and would cause the protocol to abort.
An important drawback of the FQ protocol is that it is not at all robust against losses, or delays.
Indeed, for the bit commitment to succeed, it is crucial that the various agents communicate with
perfect synchronization for all k rounds of the protocol: if one agent fails to answer one challenge
in time, then the whole protocol aborts. While this could be fine for small values of k, say k ≤ 10,
this is obviously disastrous for much larger values, for instance k ranging in the millions or billions
as in [VMH+16]. For this reason, it is important to see whether some variant of the FQ protocol
can be made tolerant against (a limited) amount of losses. In this paper, we investigate one such
variant where the original FQ protocol is modified so that both parties have now three agents at
their disposal instead of two. We present the protocol in Section 2. We prove its security against
classical adversaries in Section 3 where we show that the security scales similarly as for the FQ
protocol. Finally, in Section 4, we show that the communication cost of the protocol is comparable
to that of the FQ protocol but that its expected commitment time is quadratically improved.
2
2 Description of the commitment schemes
A commitment scheme Π = (COMM,OPEN) is the description of the protocol followed by the
honest parties during both the commit and the open phases. All the protocols that we consider
in this paper will be perfectly hiding and we will consequently only be interested in the binding
property. Therefore, we only consider the case of a cheating Alice, which will be described through
her cheating strategy Str∗ = (Comm∗,Open∗) in both phases of the protocol. The binding property
we consider is the standard sum-property, that was also used in previous work regarding relativistic
bit commitment [LKB+15, FF16, CCL15].
Definition 1 (Sum-binding). We say that a bit commitment protocol Π is ε-sum-binding if
∀ Comm∗,
1∑
d=0
max
Open∗
(Pr[Alice successfully reveals d | (Comm∗,Open∗)]) ≤ 1 + ε.
In this section, we describe successively the single-round protocol (with commitment time
bounded by τ = D/c where D is the distance between the distant locations and c is the speed
of light), the FQ multi-round protocol and finally our loss-tolerant protocol, the Tree protocol.
For simplicity of analysis, we consider in this paper that all computations are performed instan-
taneously and that information travels at the speed of light. One could relax these assumptions by
replacing τ by a smaller constant, but this would not change the various scalings of parameters and
we therefore ignore this issue here.
An important consequence of the fact that the protocols are perfectly hiding is that the spatial
configuration of the agents needs only to be checked by Bob: in particular, it is sufficient for Bob
to make sure that his agents are at a distance at least D from each other. If this is the case,
and if Alice’s agents answer their challenges in time, then Bob can deduce that her agents are also
separated by a distance D.
2.1 The single-round protocol
The single-round version of the protocol was introduced by Crépeau et al. [CSST11] (see also
[Sim07]). Both players, Alice and Bob, have agents A1,A2 and B1,B2 present at two spatial loca-
tions, L1 and L2, separated by a distance D. We consider the case where Alice makes the com-
mitment. The protocol (followed by honest players) consists of four phases: preparation, commit,
sustain and reveal. The sustain phase in the single-round protocol is trivial and simply consists in
waiting for a time less than τ , which is the time needed for light to travel between the two locations.
Overall the bit commitment protocol goes as follows.
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share a random number a ∈ FQ (resp. b ∈ FQ).
2. Commit phase: B1 sends b to A1, who returns y = a + d ∗ b where d ∈ F2 is the committed
bit. Here and everywhere in this paper, all operations are understood in FQ.
3. Sustain phase: A1 and A2 wait for some time less than τ .
4. Reveal phase: A2 reveals the values of d and a to B2 who checks that y = a+ d ∗ b.
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2.2 The FQ-protocol (multi-round, not loss-tolerant)
The single-round protocol above was recently extended to a multi-round commitment scheme
[LKB+15]. The main idea to increase the commitment time is to delay the reveal phase and have
A2 commit to the string a instead of revealing it. In fact, the new sustain phase will now consist of
many rounds where the active agents (i.e. the agent of Alice who commits in that given round and
the corresponding agent for Bob) alternate between locations L1 and L2. Overall the k-round bit
commitment protocol goes as follows (for k even):
1. Preparation phase: A1,A2 (resp. B1,B2) share k random numbers a1, . . . , ak (resp. b1, . . . , bk)
∈ FQ.
2. Commit phase (round 1): B1 sends b1 to A1, who returns y1 = a1 + d ∗ b1 where d ∈ F2 is the
committed bit.
3. Sustain phase: at round j ≤ k, active Bob sends bj ∈ FQ to active Alice, who returns
yj = aj + bj ∗ aj−1.
4. Reveal phase: A1 reveals d and ak to B1. B1 computes recursively α0 = d and αi+1 =
yi+1 − bi+1 ∗ αi and checks that αk = ak. If this is the case, Alice has successfully revealed
the bit d.
The main idea of the multi-round protocol is to delay the reveal phase in order to increase
the commitment time. This delay is obtained by making the passive Alice commit to the value
of the string she was supposed to reveal in the previous round. Since each round increases the
total commitment time by a quantity equal to τ (modulo the time needed for the various algebraic
manipulations in FQ that we ignore), one sees that the required number of rounds scales linearly
with the commitment time one wishes to achieve.
We require that round j finishes before any information about bj−1 reaches the other Alice. For
any j, this implies that Alice’s active agent has no information about bj−1. In particular, this means
that yj is independent of bj−1. This will be crucial in order to show security of the protocol.
2.3 The Tree protocol (multi-round and loss-tolerant)
In order to formulate a loss-tolerant variant of the FQ-protocol, we require that each party has
3 agents located at three locations L1, L2, L3 which are at least at a distance D from each other.
As in the FQ multi-round protocol, timing constraints are represented by rounds. In the original
protocol, at each round, a pair of agents (Ai,Bi) performs a communication round, consisting of a
challenge bi from Bob’s agent to Alice’s agent and an answer yi from Alice’s agent to Bob’s.
Our k-round Tree protocol is represented by the complete binary tree of depth k with 2k+1 − 1
nodes (recalling that the tree with a single node has depth 0 by convention). The depth of a node
v is equal to the length |v| of the string v. A node of the tree is a string v of j ≤ k letters in the
alphabet {`, r}, corresponding to left or right child. Let us denote by V the set of all nodes of the
tree, so that |V | = 2k+1 − 1 and by V ∗ the set of all internal nodes of the tree, that is nodes that
are not leaves. Let us further denote nk = |V ∗| = 2k − 1 the cardinality of V ∗. The root of the tree
is the empty string ∅. A given node v of depth j < k has two children, a left child v` and a right
child vr. A node v of depth j ≥ 1 has a unique parent v(parent) and a unique brother v(brother):
indeed, if v is of the form wt with t ∈ {`, r}, then v(parent) = w and v(brother) = wt̄ where t̄ is
the element of {`, r} distinct from t.
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To describe the Tree protocol, we need a 3-coloring c of this complete binary tree of depth k.
The coloring c is a function
c :
{
V → {1, 2, 3}
v 7→ c(v)
where V is the set of all 2k+1−1 nodes in the tree, with the coloring property that for all v of depth
j < k, it holds that
{c(v), c(v`), c(vr)} = {1, 2, 3}.
The above constraints on the colors means that for any node v, the colors c(v), c(v`) and c(vr) are
all different. In particular, two brothers have different color. This coloring will be used to assign a
location L1, L2 or L3 to each node of the tree. In other words, each node of the tree corresponds
to a communication round taking place at the location Lc(v) corresponding to the color c(v) of the
node v.
More precisely, each node v of depth j of the tree corresponds to a communication round with
a challenge bv and an answer yv between agents Ac(v) and Bc(v) at round j + 1. For a fixed depth,
several nodes can have the same color col, the corresponding agents Acol and Bcol will then perform
all those communication rounds at this time j + 1. The leaves of the protocol correspond to the
revealing phase.
The new notion that appears in the context of loss-tolerant protocols is that of a dead or alive
node: we will say that a node v fails (or is dead, or non responsive) if the corresponding agent Ac(v)
fails to answer the challenge sent to her by Bc(v) within time τ at round j = |v| − 1. Alternatively,
an agent is alive (or responsive) if she succeeds in replying in time to the challenge. In order to
account for this extra piece of information, we will denote by ⊥ Alice’s answer in case her agent is
non responsive for a given node. Said otherwise, while Bob challenges will still be elements of FQ,
the answers of Alice’s agents are elements of FQ ∪ {⊥}.
This failure can result from a global failure of the network for one agent i for some rounds, in
which case for all nodes v of the corresponding depth with c(v) = i, we will have bv =⊥. It may
also happen that agent Ai may answer some queries in time but not some others, which will result
in the corresponding nodes being alive or dead. Of course, a cheating Alice will try to exploit such
failures to increase to probability to successfully reveal the bit d of her choice.
Overall the k-round Tree bit commitment protocol goes as follows (for k ≥ 2):
1. Preparation phase: Agents Ai and Bi are located at Li for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Moreover, A1,A2,A3
(resp. B1,B2,B3) share nk = 2k − 1 random numbers (av)v∈V ∗ ∈ FnkQ (resp. (bv)v∈V ∗ ∈ F
nk
Q ).
This means that the agents share random numbers for all the internal nodes of the tree (not
for the leaves). Alice’s agents also share d ∈ {0, 1} which is the committed bit.
2. Commit phase (round 1): Bc(∅) sends b∅ to Ac(∅), who returns y∅ = a∅ + d ∗ b∅. If Bob’s
agent Bc(∅) does not receive Alice’s response before time τ , then the protocol aborts.
3. Sustain phase (rounds 2 to k): at round j+ 1 ≤ k, for each node vt of depth j+ 1 (i.e. |v| = j
and t ∈ {`, r}), agent Bc(vt) sends bvt ∈ FQ to Ac(vt) who returns yvt = avt + bvt ∗ av. If
Bc(vt) does not receive Alice’s response within time τ , the corresponding value of yvt is set to
the value corresponding to a dead node, that is yvt =⊥. When this is the case, the branch is
considered to be dead, and Bob’s agents stop sending challenges for that particular branch as
soon as they know it is dead.
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4. Reveal phase: For each node v = wt of depth k (i.e. with |w| = k − 1 and t ∈ {`, r}), Agent
Ac(v) reveals d and aw to Bc(v). Bob’s agents check (i) that for each depth j < k, the leftmost
alive node of the tree has at least one child alive and if it’s the case, then (ii) that for the
leftmost alive path (v0 = ∅, v1, . . . , vk = v) in the tree, Bob’s agents compute recursively the
values α∅ = y∅ − b∅ ∗ d, αvi = yvi − bvi ∗ αvi−1 and check that αvk = avk . If both conditions
are satisfied, then Alice has successfully revealed the bit d.
  
yv=av+bv av ( parent )
bv
yvl=avl+bvl av
bvl bvr
yvr=avr+bvr avv
vl vr
A1 B1
A2 B2 A3 B3
Figure 1: Pictorial view for an internal node of the Tree protocol. Here the coloring is such that
c(v) = 1, c(v`) = 2, c(vr) = 3.
Remark: Since only the values of the left-most alive branch matter for the verification step,
it is useless in practice to keep other branches alive. A simple modification of the above protocol
consists for Bob’s agents to keep track of the leftmost alive branch and stop sending challenges
for all other branches. We will analyze this in further detail in Section 4 where we investigate the
communication cost of the Tree protocol.
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3 Security of the Tree protocol
The three protocols described above all share the property that they are perfectly hiding. Indeed,
the role of the variables a’s shared by Alice’s agents is to hide the value of d. If all the a’s are
chosen uniformly at random in FQ which is the case if Alice follows honestly the protocol, then
they provide a one-time pad of the secret and Bob’s agents cannot obtain any information about
the value of d before the reveal phase.
For this reason, our goal is to study whether these protocols are binding. In particular, this
means that we will only be interested in the case where Bob is honest and follows the protocol, and
Alice’s agents might deviate from the protocol in order to reveal a bit that is not necessarily the
one they had in mind during the commit phase. In this paper, we assume that Alice is classical,
i.e., that her agents only share classical variables and not an entangled quantum state for instance.
The question of proving security against a quantum adversary is left for future research.
Since Bob is assumed to be honest in the analysis, it means that his agents are correctly located
at stations L1, L2 and L3. In particular, there is no need for them to check where Alice’s agents
are located: it is sufficient to know that they responded in time to guarantee that for each round,
each of them has to answer their own challenge without having access to the challenges sent to the
other agents at the same round.
In all that follows, we consider without loss of generality a deterministic strategy for Alice for
the k-round Tree protocol, in which any alive node has at least a live child. Moreover, it is useful
to understand what an optimal strategy for Alice looks like. Since only the leftmost alive branch
matters in the reveal phase, at each round, Alice should make sure that the leftmost alive node has
a live child, but she has some freedom to decide which one. It is easy to see that the best strategy
is to always keep the right child reponsive and to decide whether the keep the left one alive or not
based on the value of the challenge it receives. In other words, at each round, the left child of the
leftmost alive child will decide either to answer its challenge (in which case, it will be the leftmost
alive node at the next round), or to refuse to answer the challenge (in which case, its brother will
become the leftmost alive node at the next round).
3.1 Sketch
Our goal is to prove the security against a cheating Alice, on average over all of Bob’s random
strings b, which are drawn from the uniform distribution since Bob is honest. Depending on Alice’s
strategy and on those strings, the players will follow different leftmost paths in the tree. The idea
of the proof will be to use a recursive argument, similarly as in [CCL15]. Informally, the proof will
proceed as follows:
For each node v, we will keep track of a quantity IP (v) (the Independence Parameter) that
will quantify how independent yv is from bv(parent). For a fixed node v of depth j ≤ k − 2, we
will relate IP (v) with IP (v`) and IP (vr). Then, if we define IPj to be the average independence
parameter for nodes of depth j, we will use the previous relation to show that IPj+1 ≤ IPj + 54ε
where ε = O(1/
√
Q) is a security parameter.
Finally, in order to conclude, we will show that IPk−1 corresponds exactly to Alice’s cheating
probability. Putting this together with the fact that IP0 ≤ 12 + ε, we will obtain the desired result.
In the above sketch, we omitted many discussions about the dependencies of the above quantities.
In this section, we make the above argument formal, but defer several proofs to the Appendix. We
will organize this section as follows.
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In Subsection 3.2 below, we formally define several notions of history and of independence pa-
rameters that will be useful for our proofs. In Subsection 3.3, we relate the independence parameter
IPk−1 at the last round to the binding property of the protocol. Finally, in Section 3.4, we prove
our recursive argument, and therefore prove the security of our protocol. The more technical details
of the proof are deferred to the appendix.
3.2 Notations & Definitions
For any j ≤ k, let V≤j be the set of nodes of depth at most j and V=j the set of nodes of depth j.
Definition 2. For any integer j ∈ [k], for any set S ⊆ V≤j, let HSj be the set of possible histories
of S, i.e. the set of possible commitment values d ∈ {0, 1} and strings bv ∈ FQ for every v ∈ S.
Since each bv is an element of FQ for v ∈ S, we will identify an element of HSj as an element of
{0, 1} × F|S|Q .
Let us note that in practice, Bob’s agents stop sending challenges to nodes they know to be in
a “dead” branch, which means that the corresponding bv’s do not formally belong to FQ. For the
security analysis, however, this is irrelevant since these nodes have no impact on the revealing phase
of the bit commitment, which means that we can assume that these bv’s are elements of FQ, so that
the set of histories introduced above is well defined.
We also define Hj := H
V≤j
j and H
−S
j := H
(V≤j−S)
j , which correspond respectively to the full
history of nodes of depth at most j, and to the full history of such nodes, except for those in the
set S. Moreover, we define HS−Commj := H
S
j \{0, 1} as the set HSj where we remove the set of the
committed bit. This is convenient when we need to talk about the history of the variables bv’s
only. In particular, we have Hj = HSj ×H
−S−Comm
j . The set of all possible histories of the tree is
Hk−1 := H
V ∗
k−1, since the leaf nodes only consist of Alice revealing (Bob’s agents do not send any
challenge for those nodes).
Since we assume without loss of generality that Alice follows a deterministic strategy, a history
h ∈ Hk−1 induces Alice’s answers {yv}v∈V ∗ and therefore, if we run Alice’s strategy on some history
h, the state of all nodes, alive or dead, is fixed. Similarly, if we consider h ∈ Hj , this induces Alice’s
answers {yv}v∈V≤j and therefore, all nodes of depth at most j are known to be either alive or dead.
Definition 3. Let v ∈ V≤j and h ∈ Hj be a node and a history. We say that h is consistent with v
if when running Alice’s strategy on h, the node v is the left-most alive one at depth depth(v). We
denote by Hj(v) ⊆ Hj the set of histories consistent with v.
Notice that we have⋃
v∈V=j
Hj(v) = Hj and ∀v, v′ 6= v ∈ V=j , Hj(v) ∩Hj(v′) = ∅,
which simply states that each history up to depth j is consistent with exactly one node of V=j .
Definition 4. For v ∈ V≤j, S ⊆ V≤j and h1 ∈ HSj , we say that h1 is consistent with v if there
exists h2 ∈ H−S−Commj such that (h1, h2) ∈ Hj(v). We denote by HSj (v) ⊆ HSj the set of h1 ∈ S
consistent with v.
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By construction of the protocol, if Alice successfully reveals a value at the end, it means that for
all rounds, the leftmost alive node has an alive child. In particular, this implies that the prefix of
the leftmost alive branch doesn’t change during the execution of the protocol: if v be the leftmost
alive node at depth depth(v) for a given HSdepth(v)(v), then it remains the leftmost alive node at
depth depth(v) for any future history HSj (v) with j > depth(v). We therefore have that for any
non root node v ∈ V≤j and set S ⊆ V≤j , HSj (v) ⊆ HSj (w) where w is the parent of v.
Definition 5. For a fixed vertex v ∈ V≤j, a set S ⊆ (V≤j − {v}) and a history h ∈ HSj (v), let
Bhj (v) := {bv ∈ FQ : (h, bv) ∈ H
S∪{v}
j (v)} be the set of values for bv for which node v answers
in time. Equivalently, FQ − Bhj (v) is the set of questions for which node v will be non responsive,
according to Alice’s strategy and the history h.
Note that if v = wl is the left child of the leftmost alive node at depth depth(v)− 1, then Bhj (v)
is the set of values in FQ for which v chooses to respond in time for Alice’s strategy. On the other
hand, if bv 6∈ Bhj (v), then the node chooses to be non responsive, and the leftmost alive node at
that round becomes the right brother of v. Notice that Bhj (v) is independent of bw.
Definition 6. For j ≤ k, we define the random variable Zj which takes value v ∈ V=j with
probability Hj(v)Hj . This random variable corresponds to the node that is the leftmost alive node at
depth j.
For each node v, let us recall that Ac(v) (resp. Bc(v)) refers to Alice’s (resp. Bob’s) agent at that
node.
Definition 7. For any node v ∈ V=j, let Acc(v) ⊆ V≤j be the set of nodes containing history
information accessible to Ac(v), including the value of the commitment.
Crucially, the relativistic constraints impose that v(parent), v(brother) /∈ Acc(v).
Let us consider a vertex vj of depth j and a history h consistent with vj . The leftmost alive
path up to depth j has the form (v0 = ∅, v1, . . . , vj). Recall that the variables αvi are recursively
defined for i ≤ j by
αvi :=
{
yv0 − bv0 ∗ d if i = 0,
yvi − bvi ∗ αvi(parent) otherwise.
(1)
Recall also that αvj and yvj are functions of the history Hj since Alice’s strategy is deterministic.
Similarly as in [CCL15], we introduce a quantity IP which is the independence parameter
between a variable and a function (or a family of functions). Intuitively, this quantity is large if the
function is independent of the variable and close to 0 otherwise. In particular, it quantifies how well
the function can be approximated by another function that does not depend on the given variable.
This is relevant here since in a cheating strategy, Alice’s agent tries to answer to Bob’s challenge
without knowing the value of the challenge sent to her parent, and she wins if she manages to give
an answer that depends on that specific challenge.
Definition 8. For any integer j ≤ k − 1, any family of functions {gv : HAcc(v)j (v)→ FQ}v∈V=j , we
define
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ) := Ev←ZjEh←H−{v}j (v)
Ebv←Bhj (v)[gv(d, h) == αv(d, h, bv)], (2)
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where gv(d, h) == αv(d, h,bv) represents the variable that equals 1 if the equality [gv(d, h) = αv(d, h, bv)]
holds and 0 otherwise. Moreover, the notation Ev←Zj corresponds to the expectation over the possible
values v of the random variable Zj, and similarly for the other expectations.
Intuitively, this quantity is simply the expectation that Alice’s agent (at round j + 1) gives an
answer consistent with the value (αv) expected by Bob’s agent, for the leftmost alive node, when
averaging over all possible histories: the restriction on Alice’s strategy is that her agent at round
j+1 does not know the value of bv at round j. Note here that in the above definition, the function g
takes as inputs elements more history elements than those in HAcc(v)j (v). The function g will simply
disregard those inputs. We added them for notational simplicity but we will use later the fact that
the outcome gv(d, h) actually depends only on the history elements of H
Acc(v)
j (v).
We are finally in position to define the IP parameter at depth j.
Definition 9. For j ≤ k − 1, the IP parameter at depth j is
IPj := max
{gv}v∈V=j
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ). (3)
In the next subsection, we provide some motivation for this definition by showing that IPk−1
corresponds to Alice’s cheating probability. This can be understood intuitively because IPk−1
quantifies how well the agents of Alice at the kth round (i.e. those you reveal the bit value) can give
an answer consistent with Alice’s agent’s answer at the previous round.
3.3 Final Condition
Proposition 1. The IP parameter satisfies the following bound:
1 + εk ≤ 2IPk−1
where εk is the binding security parameter of the k-round protocol.
Proof. Let P ∗A be Alice’s cheating probability. Let P
∗
A|v be Alice’s cheating probability when the
leftmost alive node at depth k − 1 is v. We have by definition P ∗A = Ev←Zk−1 [P ∗A|v]. Let leaf(v)
be the associated leaf that will be used for the reveal phase: leaf(v) = v` if v` is alive, otherwise
leaf(v) = vr. Let (aleaf(v), d) be Alice’s output for that leaf. Recall that Bob then checks whether
αv = aleaf(v) where αv is computed recursively as in Eq. 1. Bob’s checking procedure implies that
P ∗A|v = Eh←H−{v}j (v)
Ebv←Bhj (v)[aleaf(v)(h) == αv(h, bv)]
≤ E
h←H−{v}j (v)
[ max
gv :H
Acc(v)
j (v)→FQ
{Ebv←Bhj (v)[gv(h) == αv(h, bv)]}] =: IPk−1(v)
where we averaged over all histories giving v as the leftmost node of depth k − 1. From there, we
have
P ∗A = Ev←Zk−1 [P
∗
A|v] ≤ Ev←Zk−1 [IPk−1(v)] = IPk−1
By definition of the binding property, it holds that P ∗A =
1
2(1 + εk), which yields the desired
result.
Proposition 1 shows that it is sufficient to prove a good upper bound on IPk−1 in order to show
that the bit-commitment protocol is binding.
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3.4 Bounding the value of IPk−1
Our goal is now to bound the value of IPk−1. For this, we will use a recursive argument to bound
IPj for all j ≤ k − 1. Before that, we start by finding an expression for IPj that is suitable for a
recursive analysis. Consider a node v of depth j ≤ k − 2. For a fixed history h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v),
two nodes v and vt (with t ∈ {`, r}), we define the quantity IP h0vt :
IP h0vt := max
g:FQ→FQ
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(bv) == αvt(h0, bv, bvt)], (4)
where vt is a child of node v. We show the following:
Proposition 2. For all j ≤ k − 2, it holds that:
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0
vt ],
where T (v|h0) is the function that outputs t ∈ {`, r} if the leftmost alive child of v is vt.
The proof of this proposition is based on elementary manipulations of the expected values and
is presented in detail in Appendix A.
We can now proceed to bounding IPj . We first consider the base case where j = 0.
Lemma 1.
IP0 ≤
1
2
+
√
2
Q
.
Proof. This property was already proven in [CCL15]. For completeness, we reproduce this proof
using the notations of the present paper in Appendix B.
Lemma 2. For every node v ∈ V=j, t ∈ {`, r} and history h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v) it holds that:
IP h0vt ≤ IP h0v +
√
2
|Bh0j+1(vt)|
.
where we slightly abuse notation by defining IP h0v := maxg Ebv←Bh0j
[g = αv(h0, bv)].
The reason we say we slightly abuse notation is the discrepancy on what is fixed between this
definition and the one in Equation 4. Notice that we have
IPj = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1
[IP h0v ].
Proof. We prove here Lemma 2. As in [CCL15], we use the Alice’s cheating strategy to come up
with a strategy for a variant of the CHSH game with inputs and outputs in FQ instead of F2. Then
upper bounds on the classical value of this CHSH variant allow us to bound the value of IP .
The class of CHSHQ(p) games was introduced in [CCL15] in order to analyze the security
of the FQ protocols. These are simply two-party nonlocal games between Adeline and Bastian
who respectively receive inputs x, y ∈ FQ and output a, b ∈ FQ. Here x is drawn from the uniform
distribution while y is drawn according to a probability distribution {py}y∈FQ such that maxy py ≤ p.
Adeline and Bastian win the game if a + b = x ∗ y in FQ. Let us define a slight variant of these
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games where the only difference is now that Adeline’s inputs are drawn uniformly from a subset S
of FQ. We denote this class of games by CHSHSQ(p).
We start with Equation 4:
IP h0vt = max
g:FQ→FQ
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(bv) == αvt(h0, bv, bvt)].
We write αvt(h, bv, bvt) = yvt(h, bvt)+bvt∗αv(h, bv). From there, we can see that the dependence
in bv of the function αvt(h, bv, bvt) lies only in the function αv(h, bv). Therefore, we can write
IP h0vt = max
g:FQ→FQ
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(αv(h0, bv)) == αvt(h0, bv, bvt)]. (5)
Let Gh0 be the function g that maximizes the above expression. In order to end the proof, we per-
form the following steps: (1) we define an entangled game that will be an instance of some CHSHSQ
game for some S, (2) we construct a cheating strategy for this game using the functions yvt and
Gh
0 and finally (3) we use the known bounds on CHSHSQ to derive a bound on IP
h0
vt .
We consider the following game between two players Adeline and Bastian:
• Adeline receives a random element X ∈ Bh0j+1(vt). Bastian receives an element Y ∈ FQ such
that Pr[Y = c] = Prbv [αv(h, bv) = c].
• Their goal is to respectively output A and B in Fq such that A+B = X ∗ Y
Recall that IP h0v = maxc Prbv←Bh0j (v)
[αv(h, bv) = c]. Since Adeline has no information about bv,
her probability of guessing Y is upper bounded by IP h0v . This means that the two player game we
study is an instance of CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v ). We know from Lemma 6 (proven in Appendix C) the
following upper bound on the classical value of such a game:
ω
(
CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v )
)
≤ IP h0v +
√
2
|Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)|
.
We now use Alice’s cheating strategy to derive a strategy for the above game. Adeline outputs
A = yvt(h0, X) and Bastian outputs B = −Gh0(Y ). We can lower bound the value of the game as
follows:
ω(CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v )) ≥ Pr
X,Y
[A+B = X ∗ Y ]
≥ Pr
X,Y
[yvt(h0, X)− Gh0(Y ) = X ∗ Y ]
= Pr
X,bv
[yvt(h0, X)− Gh0(αv(h0, bv)) = X ∗ αv(h0, bv)]
= Pr
X,bv
[αvt(h, bv, X) + (αv(h0, bv) ∗X)− Gh0(αv(h0, bv)) = (X ∗ αv(h0, bv))]
= Pr
X,bj
[αvt(h, bv, X) = Gh0(αv(h0, bv))]
= IP h0vt .
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Combining the upper and the lower bound on ω(CHSH
B
h0
j+1(vt)
Q (IP
h0
v )), we conclude that
IP h0vt ≤ IP h0v +
√
2
|Bh0j+1(vt)|
.
We are now ready to prove the recurrence relation.
Proposition 3. For j ≤ k − 2, it holds that:
IPj+1 ≤ IPj +
5
4
√
2
Q
.
Proof. For v ∈ Zj , h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 , the probability that Alice is responsive at node v`, or equiv-
alently, that v` is the leftmost alive node at round j + 1, is Pr[T (v|h0) = `] =
|Bh0j+1(v`)|
Q =: Ph0 .
Proposition 2 gives:
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0
vt ]
= Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[Ph0IP
h0
v` + (1− Ph0)IP
h0
vr ]
We use Lemma 2 in order to bound IP h0vl and IP
h0
vr . We have by definition |B
h0
j+1(vl)| = Ph0Q
and |Bh0j+1(vr)| = Q. From there, we have
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[
Ph0
(
IP h0v +
√
2
Ph0Q
)
+ (1− Ph0)
(
IP h0v +
√
2
Q
)]
(6)
= Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[
IP h0v + (1 +
√
Ph0 − Ph0)
√
2
Q
]
≤ Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[
IP h0v +
5
4
√
2
Q
]
(7)
= IPj +
5
4
√
2
Q
where we used the bound (1 +
√
P − P ) ≤ 54 for P ≥ 0 in Eq. 7.
Combining Propositions 1, 3 and Lemma 1 gives our main result.
Corollary 1. The k-round Tree protocol is εk-sum-binding with
εk ≤
5k√
2Q
.
This scaling is very close to the one of the FQ protocol for which the binding parameter is upper
bounded by 2
√
2k/
√
Q according to Ref. [CCL15].
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4 Loss tolerance and communication cost of the Tree protocol
The main point of considering the Tree protocol instead of the simpler FQ-protocol is that it
displays some loss tolerance. In this section, we consider a very simple model of loss and evaluate
the performance of the Tree protocol compared to the FQ-protocol.
For this, we assume that in the honest case, each station (corresponding to a couple Ai,Bi) dies
with some probability p at each round of the protocol. This process is taken to be independent
and identical. Moreover, we consider the scenario where a dead station remain dead for a time mτ ,
where m is some small integer such that m  k and mp  1. This loss model could of course be
refined, for instance by adding correlations between the various probabilities of dying for modeling
a global network failure for example, or by taking the dead time to be a random variable as well,
but our simplified model allows for a more straightforward comparison of the different protocols and
arguably already captures the behavior of realistic failures due to loss in bit commitment protocols.
Observation 1. In the honest scenario where all players follow the protocol but losses are allowed,
the Tree protocol protocol aborts if and only if two stations are dead at the same time (except at the
first round).
Proposition 4. Provided that mp 1 and m k, the probabilities that the k-round FQ and Tree
protocols don’t abort are given by
Pok(FQ) = (1− p)k (8)
Pok(Tree) = (1− q)k (9)
with q = 3(mp)2 + (mp)3.
Proof. Let us first consider the FQ protocol: it aborts as soon as one station dies. At each round,
a honest Alice responds in time with probability 1 − p. Since these events are assumed to be
independent, the probability that Alice responds in time for the full protocol, that is, all k rounds,
is Pok(FQ) = (1− p)k.
In the Tree protocol, each station is non-responsive at a given round i ≥ m with probability
mp if we assume that mp  1: this is the probability that the station died during any of the m
previous rounds. The probability that at least two stations are alive at a given round is equal to the
probability that at most one of the three stations is non-responsive, that is (mp)3 + 3(mp)2 = q. It
follows that the probability that the Tree protocol does not abort is (1 − q)k, in the regime where
m is negligible compared to the number of rounds.
Let us define the half-life tΠ(p) of a protocol Π as the number of rounds required to achieve
Pok(Π) ≈ 1/e if each station dies independently with probability p. Then, Proposition 4 states that
tFQ(p) =
1
mp
and tTree(p) =
1
q
≈ 1
3m2p2
(10)
provided that mp 1. In particular, adding a third player to the standard FQ-protocol provides a
quadratic improvement in the expected half-life of the commitment time.
Let us now evaluate the communication cost of the various protocols, that is the number of bits
that are exchanged among various agents during the whole protocol. Note first that by construction,
all the challenges and responses are elements of FQ, meaning that each round (corresponding to
each alive node in the Tree protocol) has an individual cost of 2 log2Q bits.
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Proposition 5. The communication cost CFQ and CTree of the k-round FQ and Tree protocols are
given by:
CFQ = 2k log2Q (11)
CTree ≈ k2N+2 log2Q, (12)
where N is the number of rounds necessary for all agents to realize that a given branch is dead.
Recall that taking log2Q = O(log(k/ε)) is sufficient to guarantee that the protocol is ε-binding.
In practice, the value of N will be a small constant, which shows that the communication cost
of the Tree protocol compares favorably with that of the original k-round FQ protocol.
Proof. Obtaining the communication cost of the FQ protocol is straightforward: there are k rounds
that each cost 2 log2Q bits.
For the Tree protocol, we consider the “worst case scenario” where Alice’s agents always respond
in time. This means that all branches are alive unless Bob’s agents decide not to send them
challenges anymore. Since only the leftmost alive branch matters in the reveal phase, and since
the prefix of the leftmost alive node never changes during the protocol, it is easy to see that Bob’s
agents do not need to continue sending challenges to branches that they know not to be the leftmost
alive branch. In general, it may take N additional rounds before all agents learn the status of all the
history up to a given round. This means that in the worst case, Bob’s agents should send challenges
to all the descendants of the current leftmost alive node for N rounds. The number of such nodes
is upper bounded by 2N+1. Since there are k rounds in total, the communication cost of the Tree
protocol Tree can be upper bounded by 2N+1k × 2 log2Q bits.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new relativistic bit commitment protocol that addresses one of the
main weaknesses of the FQ protocol, namely its fragility against network failures. Indeed, the
FQ protocol aborts as soon as one agent fails to respond to a single challenge in time. We fix
this issue by modifying the FQ protocol so that each party is now represented by 3 agents in 3
distinct locations. The communication cost of this variant is relatively modest, but the gain in
terms of tolerance to loss is very good: one expects a quadratic gain for the number of rounds that
the protocol can sustain, making it very promising for implementations in real telecom networks
(instead of dedicated networks), which is crucial for a possible future deployment of this technology.
We conclude with a couple of open problems that are left for future investigation. First, the tree
structure that we rely on here does not seem to be optimal and simpler schemes with reduced com-
munication complexity would be interesting. Second, our security analysis is restricted to classical
adversaries, as was already the case in [CCL15, FF16] and the obvious next step is to see whether
one can also prove security against quantum adversaries. The main difficulty to extend the analysis
to the quantum case is that the composition of the rounds is more complicated to handle because
the history is not described by classical random variables anymore, but rather by quantum states.
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This appendix contains the proofs of the main technical claims as well as a short description of
the generalization of the Tree protocol to an arbitrary number of agents per party.
A Proof of Sum inversions
In this section, we prove Proposition 2 which we recall below.
Proposition 6. For j ≤ k − 2,
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0∈H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0
vt ].
Proof. Fix an integer j, a node v ∈ V=j and a history h1 ∈ H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v). Let us define T (v|h1), the
random variable equal to ‘`’ with probability
|Bh1j+1(v`)|
Q and ‘r’ with probability 1−
|Bh1j+1(v`)|
Q . If h1
is consistent with v, then vt with t = T (v|h1) is the left-most alive node at depth j + 1. Let us also
define
Ch1t (v`) =
{
Bh1j+1(v`) if t = `
FQ −Bh1j+1(v`) if t = r
to be the set of possible values of bv` conditioned on the node v` being responsive (C`) or not (Cr).
By averaging over histories h1 consistent with the node v, we define the random variable T (v)
equal to ‘`’ with probability |Hj+1(v`)||Hj+1(v)| and to ‘r’ with probability
|Hj+1(vr)|
|Hj+1(v)| = 1−
|Hj+1(v`)|
|Hj+1(v)| :
T (v) := E
h1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)
[T (v|h1)]. (13)
Lemma 3.
IPj+1({gv′}v′∈V=j+1)
= Ev←ZjEh1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h1)Ebv`←Ch1t (v`)Ebvr←FQ [gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
Proof. According to the definition of IPj+1 we have,
IPj+1({gv′}v′∈V=j+1) = Ev′←Zj+1Eh←H−{v′}j+1 (v′)
Ebv′←Bhj+1(v′)[gv′(d, h) == αv′(d, h, bv′)]
= Ev←ZjEt←T (v)Eh←H−{vt}j+1 (vt)
Ebvt←Bhj+1(vt)[gvt(d, h) == αvt(d, h, bvt)]
The statement of the lemma follows from the fact that avt does not depend on bvt.
Lemma 4.
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0∈H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h0)
max
gvt
E
bv∈B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt∈B
(h0,bv)
j+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)].
Proof. From Lemma 3, we have
IPj+1({gv′}) = Ev←ZjEh1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h1)Ebv`←Ch1t (v`)Ebvr←FQ [gvt(d, h1, bvt) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
(14)
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From the definition of IPj we have,
IPj+1 = max
gvt∈V=j+1
IPj+1({gv′}) (15)
Since avt(d, h1, bvt) doesn’t depend on bvt, the value of IPj+1 remains unchanged if gvt depends only
on h1. This implies that we can write IPj+1 as follows,
IPj+1 = max
gvt
Ev←ZjEh1←H−{v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h1)Ebvt←Bh1j+1(vt)
[gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
= max
gvt
Ev←ZjE(h0,bv)←(H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)×Bh0j )
Et←T (v|h0,bv)Ebvt←Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
where h1 = (h0, bv)
IPj+1 = max
gvt
Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
E
bv∈B
h0
j
Et←T (v|h0,bv)Ebvt←Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h1) == αvt(d, h1, bvt)]
= max
gvt
Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
E
bv∈B
h0
j
Et←T (v|h0)Ebvt←Bh0,bvj+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)]
Notice that once we fix a leftmost alive node, the decision to go left or right is independent of bv.
Therefore, we have T (v|h0) = T (v|h0, bv), for any bv ∈ Bh0j (v).
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0←H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h0) maxgvt
E
bv∈B
h0
j
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[gvt(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)].
For a fixed history h0 ∈ H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v) and d, we define the quantity IP
h0
vt in following manner,
IP h0,dvt := max
gh0
E
bv←B
h0
j (v)
E
bvt←B
h0,bv
j+1 (vt)
[g(d, h0, bv) == αvt(d, h0, bv, bvt)]. (16)
Substituting the expression of IP h0,dvt in the expression of IPj+1 we get,
IPj+1 = Ev←ZjEh0∈H−{v,v`,vr}j+1 (v)
Et←T (v|h0)[IP
h0,d
vt ]. (17)
B Base case of the recursion: j = 0
We first consider the base case where j = 0.
Lemma 5.
IP0 ≤
1
2
+
√
2
Q
.
Proof. According to the definition of IPj we have,
IPj = max
{gv}v∈V=j
IPj({gv}v∈V=j ), (18)
where,
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IPj({gv}v∈V=j ) = Ev←ZjEh←H−{v}j (v)
Ebv←Bhj (v)[gv(d, h) == αj(d, h, bv)]. (19)
For j = 0, i.e., at the root of the tree, we have V=j = {v0}, where v0 = ∅, H−{v0}0 (v0) contains
only the commitment d and Bhj (v) = FQ. So, we have IP0 = maxgv0 Ed←{0,1}Ebv0←FQ [gv0(d) ==
αv0(d, bv0)]. Here we give the upper bound on IP0 by reducing it to an instance G of the following
nonlocal games between two players Adeline and Bastian, where
• Adeline receives a random element bv0 ∈ FQ. Bastian receives a random element d ∈ {0, 1}.
• Their goal is to respectively output A and B in FQ such that A+B = bv0 ∗ d.
Without any loss of generality we can consider Adeline and Bastian’s strategy to be deter-
ministic, namely Adeline’s strategy is a deterministic function yv0(bv0) and Bastian’s strategy is a
deterministic function −gv0(d). This strategy gives a lower bound on the value ω(G) of the game:
ω(G) ≥ max
gv0
Pr
bv0 ,d
[yv0(bv0)− gv0(d) = bv0 ∗ d]
= max
gv0
Pr
bv0 ,d
[αv0(d, bv0) + d ∗ bv0)− gv0(d) = (bv0 ∗ d)]
(substituting yv0 = αv0 + bv0 ∗ d)
= max
gv0
Pr
bv0 ,d
[gv0(d) == αv0(d, bv0)]
= IP0.
We can conclude using the result of Lemma 6 proven in the next section to the case where p = 1/2
and S = {0, 1}: we obtain
IP0 ≤
1
2
+
√
2
Q
. (20)
C A generalization of CHSHQ(p) games with restricted inputs.
The class of CHSHQ(p) games was introduced in [CCL15] in order to analyze the security of the FQ
protocols. These are simply two-party nonlocal games between Adeline and Bastian who respectively
receive inputs x, y ∈ FQ and output a, b ∈ FQ. Here x is drawn from the uniform distribution while
y is drawn according to a probability distribution {py}y∈FQ such that maxy py ≤ p. Adeline and
Bastian win the game if a+ b = x ∗ y in FQ.
Here, we define a slight variant of these games where the only difference is now that Adeline’s
inputs are drawn uniformly from a subset S of FQ. We denote this class of games by CHSHSQ(p).
In particular, one has CHSHQ(p) = CHSH
FQ
Q (p).
It is straightforward to upper bound the classical value of games in CHSHSQ(p) using the same
technique as in [CCL15]. For completeness, we include this proof here.
Lemma 6. For any game G ∈ CHSHSQ(p), we have
ω(G) ≤ p+
√
2
|S|
. (21)
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Proof. Fix a game G ∈ CHSHSQ(p). As usual, the classical value of the game can always be achieved
with a deterministic strategy, meaning that without loss of generality, Alice and Bob’s strategies
can be modeled by functions f and g, namely: a = f(x) and b = g(y). Define the variable ryx equal
to 1 if f(x) + g(y) = x ∗ y and 0 otherwise.
Consider the following strategy for Bob: pick a random pair of distinct inputs y, y′ according
to the distribution {py}y∈Fq , i.e. with probability pyp′y/P where P =
∑
y 6=y′ pyp
′
y, and output the
guess x̂ for x defined by x̂ = (g(y) − g(y′)) ∗ (y − y′)−1. Let Sx be the probability of correctly
guessing the value x with this strategy. Non signaling imposes that Ex[Sx] = 1/|S|, since the value
x is uniformly distributed in S.
On the other hand, we note that if the game G is won for both inputs (x, y) and (x, y′), then
Bob’s strategy outputs the correct value for x. Indeed, winning the game for both inputs means
that f(x) + g(y) = x ∗ y and f(x) + g(y′) = x ∗ y′ which implies that g(y)− g(y′) = (y− y′) ∗ x and
therefore x̂ = x. One immediately obtains a lower bound on Sx:
Sx ≥
1
P
∑
y,y′ 6=y
pyr
y
xp
′
yr
y′
x ≥
∑
y,y′ 6=y
pyr
y
xp
′
yr
y′
x , (22)
where the second inequality follows from the fact that P ≤ 1. Consider the quantity ωx =
∑
y pyr
y
x.
It satisfies:
(ωx)2 ≤
∑
y
p2y(r
y
x)
2 + 2Sx =
∑
y
(py)
2ryx + 2Sx ≤ pωx + 2Sx,
where the first inequality follows from the bound of Eq. 22 and where we used that (ryx)2 = ryx and
(py)
2 ≤ (maxy{py}) py ≤ ppy. Solving this quadratic equation gives that
ωx ≤ 1
2
(
p+
√
p2 + 8Sx
)
and the concavity of the square-root function implies that
ωx ≤ p+
√
2Sx.
Finally, ω(G) = Ex[ωx] by definition and using the concavity of the square-root function once more
shows that:
ω(G) ≤ p+
√
2Ex[
√
Sx] ≤ p+
√
2
√
Ex[Sx] ≤ p+
√
2/|S|,
which concludes the proof.
D Generalization to n agents per party
It is straightforward to generalize the Tree protocol to the case where each party is represented by n
agents. In that case, the binary tree should be replaced by a complete n-ary tree, together with an
n-coloring of that tree. For the protocol to abort, it requires that n− 1 stations die simultaneously.
It is straightforward to see that the probability that the protocol succeeds becomes (1− q(n))k with
q(n) = n(mp)n−1 + (mp)n. (23)
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Provided that nmp  1, the half-life of the generalized Tree protocol Tree(n) with n agents per
player becomes:
tTree(n)(p,m) ≈
1
n(mp)n−1
. (24)
It is less straightforward to generalize the security proof to the case of n agents. However, it is
natural to conjecture that an analysis similar to that of Proposition 3 for the Tree protocol with 3
locations will work.
Conjecture 7. The k-round Tree protocol with n ≥ 3 agents per party is εk,n-binding with
εk,n = 2kxn
√
2
Q
(25)
with
x2 = 1, xn = xn−1 +
1
4xn−1
. (26)
In particular, asymptotically, it holds that xn ∼
√
n/2.
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